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PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A “GOOD TAX”




by Kenneth L. Nichols
A “good tax”—can there be such a thing? In this essay, 
Kenneth Nichols explores the principles for evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of  taxes on income, consump-
tion, and wealth. Contrary to common argument, Nichols 
points out, there is no “best” tax, but there are ﬁve inter-
related criteria for evaluating taxes that, collectively, may 
be used to assess whether tax reform efforts are moving us 
closer to or further away from a better overall tax system 
for Maine.    
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PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING A “GOOD TAX”
A good tax? Can there be such a thing? Interest groups, the public, and Maine’s state and local 
policymakers are investing much political energy 
exploring ways to achieve a sounder, fairer apportion-
ment of  the tax burden at the state and local levels. 
Many factors contribute to why Maine residents ﬁnd 
themselves living in a state with high per capita taxes. 
The size of  the overall tax burden is an issue that 
appears often in political speeches and in news stories. 
But how the general tax burden—whether heavy or 
light—is distributed among us all is a separate issue.
CATEGORIES OF TAXES
We can tax three things—income, consumption, and wealth—and we do. Each level of  govern-
ment has tax categories it favors and others it tradition-
ally avoids. Federal and state governments favor income 
taxes. These include taxes on individual incomes and 
taxes on business proﬁts. A few urban centers across 
the country—none of  which are in Maine—assess a 
“commuter tax” or “service-center tax” on locally earned 
wages. Commuter taxes bolster core city infrastructure 
that suburban residents enjoy, but would otherwise not 
support through their own local taxes. Income taxes 
also encompass a family of  taxes known as payroll or 
employment taxes—that is, speciﬁc taxes on wages and 
salaries that help to fund social security and unemploy-
ment compensation programs.
States are the biggest users of  consumption 
taxes. These include retail sales taxes, special taxes on 
commodities such as petroleum products and a few 
luxury items, and “sin” taxes applied to products such 
as alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Some states permit 
an add-on of  one percent or so to the state sales tax 
rate, then return that percentage to the locality where 
it was collected. Maine is not one of  those states. The 
federal government has traditionally stayed away from 
retail sales taxes, though it does tax tobacco, alcohol, 
gasoline, and other products. 
Localities are the heaviest users of  taxes on wealth, 
although both federal and state governments assert 
wealth taxes in limited ways. The most prevalent tax 
on wealth is the property tax on real estate, but this tax 
category also includes taxes imposed on personal prop-
erty, on estates left by dece-
dents, and on large gifts. 
Finding an equitable mix 
of  these taxes is not easy. There 
is no single solution. Each 
possibility affects some people 
differently from others— 
which is where reasonableness, 
creativity, political will, and 
public pressure come into play. 
PRINCIPLES FOR 
EVALUATING A TAX
Each of  the three basic cate-gories of  taxation—taxes on income, consump-
tion, and wealth—has its strengths and weaknesses. 
That means there is no “best” tax, though we some-
times argue as if  there were. Nonetheless, such  
arguments can be healthy public discourse when  
they are based on commonly accepted principles,  
characteristics, or criteria for evaluating what makes  
a tax bad or good. And it turns out that such criteria 
do exist: the ﬁve interrelated principles for creating  
a “good tax” are fairness, simplicity, neutrality, adminis-
trability, and sufﬁciency.
A fair tax is one that has approximately the same 
relative impact on all taxpayers. One facet of  a fair tax 
is that it has “horizontal equity,” which simply means 
that taxpayers in similar situations pay the same amount 
of  tax. Given the diverse ways of  arriving at the same 
bottom line (e.g., wage versus nonwage income, salary 
versus self-employment), this is tougher to achieve than 
it seems; consequently, a large part of  any tax code is 
devoted to getting to that bottom line.
A second facet of  a fair tax is “vertical equity,” 
which means being mindful that taxpayers of  lesser 
means will be harder hit by a given tax percentage 
than will taxpayers of  greater means. Proportional and 
regressive taxes hurt poorer taxpayers the most, while 
progressive tax rates dampen that impact. For example, 
a 20 percent income tax would be more painful for a 
taxpayer earning only $20,000, who may have trouble 
meeting basic needs, than for a taxpayer earning 
$200,000. This leads to the concepts of  progressive 
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and regressive taxation. Progressive taxes, such as our 
federal and state individual income tax rates, are gradu-
ated so that higher-income taxpayers pay higher tax 
rates than do lower-income taxpayers. 
But many taxes tend to be regressive, dispropor-
tionately hitting taxpayers who are at the lower end 
of  the economic spectrum. This is true for payroll 
taxes such as social security taxes, which stop once the 
worker has earned a certain amount of  salary during 
the year. The cut-off  amount is currently $90,000, 
which means someone earning $180,000 only pays 
social security taxes on the ﬁrst half  of  her or his 
salary. Property and sales taxes also tend to be regres-
sive unless they are tempered in ways that mitigate 
their impact on low-income taxpayers. Two methods 
Maine uses to mitigate property tax regressivity (i.e., 
improve vertical equity) are the homestead exemp-
tion and the circuit breaker exemption. The homestead 
exemption is an amount by which the value of  a home-
owner’s principal dwelling is reduced when applying 
the tax rate (mill rate) against that home, effectively 
waiving property tax on the ﬁrst several thousand 
dollars of  value for that property. The circuit breaker 
exemption rebates a portion of  the property tax to 
homeowners and renters with modest incomes whose 
property taxes or rents exceed a certain portion of  their 
incomes. A version of  the circuit breaker exemption 
not used in Maine holds the property’s taxable value 
essentially constant until the property changes hands.
Of  course, “tempering” has a way of  reducing a 
tax’s simplicity, the second characteristic of  a good tax. 
A simple tax is one that is easy to understand and to 
comply with. A straight retail sales tax is probably the 
simplest tax around. The legislature could choose to 
impose a broad-based six (or ﬁve or four) percent sales 
tax on every product sold within the state, in which 
case each dollar someone spends at a local grocery store 
or pharmacy would cost six (or ﬁve or four) cents extra 
in sales tax. Simple—but regressive. That box of  cereal, 
carton of  milk, or bottle of  cough syrup would cost 
more, making it more difﬁcult for folks at the poverty 
level to buy food or medicine. However, as soon as the 
legislature passed measures to temper the regressivity of  
the sales tax—say, by exempting medicines and certain 
food items from sales tax or by setting up a rebate 
program for low-income residents—simplicity would 
begin to erode. So, unfortunately, fairness and simplicity 
often are at odds when designing a good tax.
One approach for dealing with the fairness-
simplicity dilemma is what former Internal Revenue 
Commissioner Fred Goldberg has referred to as 
“rough justice”: paying attention to areas that affect 
the most people and the people most in need (fair 
but not so simple) while recognizing that other injus-
tices will not be addressed (simple but not so fair). 
For example, exempting prescription medications and 
medical products from taxation would help many 
people, but not those who rely on over-the-counter 
medications. If  all medications were considered 
exempt, determining the line between medication and 
health food, nutrition supplements, and even some 
candies would become complicated. 
Neutrality is the third principle. A neutral tax is 
one that does not inﬂuence whether parties will prefer 
one type of  exchange over another. (This is not the 
same as a similar-sounding tax term, “revenue neutral,” 
which means a new mixture of  taxes calculated to yield 
the same overall tax revenue.) Here, too, sales taxes 
provide a clear example. Take widgets, the universal 
gadget. I want one, and it costs $99.95, plus sales 
tax, at my local store. It also costs $99.95 through a 
catalog or over the Internet, but there I pay no sales tax 
and happen to be offered free shipping. I’m a frugal 
consumer in no hurry, so which widget will I prefer? 
Probably the untaxed catalog item. Outside forces can 
affect neutrality, compromising the principle when 
social goals become compelling. For instance, heavy 
taxes help to discourage the use of  products such as 
alcohol and tobacco, while tax breaks encourage certain 
business practices, individual homeownership, and 
charitable giving, among other behaviors.
The fourth principle is to establish an adminis-
trable tax, a tax that is workable to implement and 
maintain. If  the government cannot enforce a tax 
effectively, establishing that tax is probably a bad idea. 
Simpler taxes are typically easier to administer than   
are complicated taxes. Collection at source—as with a 
retail sales tax, for example, or with income tax with-
holding on wages—is more effective than after-the-fact 
compliance. Staying with the widget purchase example, 
ENDNOTE
1. An abbreviated version of this 
paper appeared as an op-ed 
piece in the Bangor Daily News 
(p. 10) on January 6, 2005.
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let’s say I buy a widget in May through an out-of-state 
catalog company. The seller collects no sales tax, yet 
the law says that I, as a taxpaying resident, owe that 
tax. Unless I keep a record of  that transaction, the 
details will be a challenge for me after the end of  the 
year, when I prepare my next state tax return. It will 
likewise be a challenge for state tax collectors since, 
without subpoenaing my credit card records, they will 
not know about the transaction either, making inter-
state transactions a difﬁcult sales tax to administer. 
What our state and many others do, instead, is to estab-
lish an add-on “use tax” to the state income tax return, 
wherein taxpayers look up an estimated tax amount 
based on their income. More rough justice.
The ﬁfth principle, a sufﬁcient tax, is one that 
raises sufﬁcient revenue to address the need for which 
it is imposed. Some types of  taxes have more potential 
than others for generating tax revenue. An obvious key 
factor is the tax rate. Not quite as obvious but possibly 
more important is the base to which the tax is applied. 
The broader the base is the more revenue-generating 
potential that tax has. For that reason, a small tax on 
all retail sales would generate far more money for the 
state treasury than an enormous tax imposed on a 
high-cost luxury item. But determining the appropriate 
base raises potential conﬂicts among the principles of  
fairness, simplicity, and sufﬁciency—if  not among all 
ﬁve principles.
HELPFUL, NECESSARY, AND TOUGH
In the real world, consequently, coming up with a good tax is tough. Maine’s effort to make the prop-
erty tax burden more equitable underscores these chal-
lenges, both technical and political. The good news 
is that, although these principles generally apply to a 
speciﬁc type of  tax, they readily apply to a mixture 
of  taxes designed to offset the structural weaknesses 
of  one type of  tax with the strengths of  another. It 
is hoped that the mixture itself  would be orchestrated 
because, just as a healthy diet draws from a variety 
of  food groups, sound tax policy relies on a balance 
among categories of  taxes. Striking that balance is difﬁ-
cult given the needs of  the many stakeholders involved 
and the evolving dynamic of  any state’s economy. 
“Taxes are what we pay for 
civilized society,” as Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes reminded us long ago. 
Finding ways of  optimizing 
each of  these ﬁve principles 
is an essential battle in deter-
mining what, for all Mainers, 
will be a good tax.  
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